The meeting of the G20 leaders took place at the end of last week in Pittsburgh amidst expectations for agreements on co-ordinated reductions in economic and financial system support, changes to bank regulation and supervision, limitations on bank executive remuneration and some agreement on measures to deal with climate change. These were high expectations for a one-day meeting, although all of these issues had effectively been dealt with behind the scenes and ahead of the meeting (in all, there were 19 key points of agreement). As it was, it was none of these issues that grabbed the initial headlines. The headlines were more self congratulatory - "It worked", a reference to having taken sufficient action to avoid a recession becoming a depression, and the elevation of the G20 to become the key global economic forum, replacing the old world's G7 and G8.Nevertheless, in anticipation of the meeting the IMF released chapters two and three of its upcoming Global Financial Stability Report, dealing with how to disengage from the support mechanisms introduced during the crisis and with restarting securitisation markets. The chapters would provide a framework for discussion.The IMF pointed out that crisis interventions had been effective in calming distressed financial markets, with liquidity support being most effective in the early stages and bank recapitalisation and asset purchases most effective in later stages. As a result, the market prices of some financial instruments have stabilised and debt issuance is increasing. Critically, disengagement from crisis interventions should be guided by the return of lasting confidence and the process of unwinding should be clearly communicated before commencing. Moreover, countries should coordinate the unwinding of bank guarantees to avoid arbitrage opportunities across sectors or national borders.The G20 committed to sustain their strong policy response until a durable recovery is secured. Exit strategies will be prepared but withdrawal of extraordinary policy support will occur in a cooperative and coordinated way, and only when the time is right.On securitisation, the IMF said failure to restart securitisation would come at the cost of prolonged bank funding pressures, a diminution of credit and a continuing need for central banks and governments to take up the slack. Furthermore, proposals for increased capital requirements, tighter accounting standards for off-balance sheet entities, retention requirements and enhanced disclosure requirements were all moves in the right direction. The G20 called on securitisation originators to retain part of the risk of the underlying assets.       In the lead up to the meeting, two schools of thought had become evident about how to deal with banks that are too big to fail. They could be classified as the European school and the American school, although this would not be entirely accurate. But broadly speaking the European school is arguing for the big banks to be broken up - the goal is to have small banks that can be allowed to fail without risking systemic stability. On Thursday, the EU announced that it intends to establish the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System of Financial